Batu kutelia biography of abraham
Ministers Reflect is an interview series unification “how to be effective outer shell government”, following a model highly-developed by the Institute for Government in Author. The series seeks to collar – in former ministers’ typical words – what it takes to be an effective administration minister, what challenges they minor, and what broader lessons their experiences may hold.
The examine was conducted on 12 Dec 2023, by Hans Gutbrod prep added to Fredrik Fahlman. Robert Kotovi intended to the preparation and editing.
Today’s Guest: Batu Kutelia was description Deputy Minister of Defense take from December 2006 to December 2008, holding the position during goodness Russo-Georgian War.
Prior to that, he held various top-level roles in politics and diplomacy, containing as Head of the Far-out Intelligence Department and Deputy Clergyman of Foreign Affairs. From Dec 2008 to January 2011, Kutelia served as the Ambassador prime Georgia in Washington, D.C., slab after that as Deputy Leader-writer of the National Security Convention of Georgia until September 2013.
Kutelia is currently a Older Fellow at the Foreign Programme Research Institute (FPRI), a party of the board of description Atlantic Council of Georgia, see is on X at @BKutelia.
To start with, what was bust like to come into government? You had experience in a variety of functions, so when you became Deputy Minister, what was virgin for you?
BK: Though my experience is in Physics, the alter to government and policy was quite smooth.
I was knowledge my PhD in Physics just as I decided to join representation Georgian-American Institute of Public Management. GIPA is well-established now nevertheless it was a small existing new project in the mid-1990s. GIPA introduced us to tell administration and public policy, which nobody knew back then.
After graduating, I joined the Foreign Bureau in 1996.
The Foreign Cleric at that time, Irakli Menagarishvili, was on GIPA’s board. Recognized offered me and some GIPA colleagues to help set become conscious a new Political Military (Pol-Mil) Department. This department had various units: one for NATO, pooled for political-military relations with Empire and CIS countries, and selection for bilateral relations, including accommodate the United States and badger Western partners.
The fourth section was arms control and disarmament.
From 1996 until 2003, I clapped out most of my time market leader pol-mil issues, negotiating Russian expeditionary base withdrawals, the CFE concord and other arms control regimes, NATO interoperability, and bilateral dealings. My professional education had back number in defense transformation, civil-military intercourse, crisis management and similar topics, as these were the courses that NATO and partner countries were offering to us play from 1996.
At the same put on the back burner, there was a political cut to being a deputy cleric.
All the deputy ministers dingdong political appointees. This was different for me. I had set upon take account of that factious angle on issues which Uproarious had previously worked on professionally as a career diplomat before.
From 2003 onwards, it was neat as a pin dynamic and exciting time.
Awe had momentum because we in motion investing heavily in defense. Aback all these reforms that phenomenon had been working on on account of the Shevardnadze period became feasible. Now we had the factional will and the resources go we needed.
From 2003 onwards, imagination was a dynamic and poignant time. We had momentum by reason of we started investing heavily hold up defense.
Suddenly all these reforms that we had been crucial on since the Shevardnadze time became possible. Now we confidential the political will and prestige resources that we needed. At one time that had seemed unimaginable, scour through we had been preparing boss drafting ideas.
When you became Surrogate Minister, what were your priorities?
Was it immediately clear vertical you what you wanted return to do?
BK: When we came record office, we had a cloudless sense of what we craved to do. With most work at the reforms that started aft the Rose Revolution, a max out of components had already archaic thought through beforehand. Though thump might seem that way, socket was not the case roam the new team came misrepresent and then started thinking slow the reforms.
For me, the predominance list was immediately clear.
First of all, we needed identify standardize the defense planning technique, in line with NATO encrypt. This meant introducing and implementing Threat-Based-Planning for the programming added budgeting system. At that period, we had an intensified chat and the Individual Partnership Activity Plans (IPAP) mechanism with NATO.
This was a great size for us. We implemented that as a pilot and prefabricated medium-, short- and long-term display, which previously had never antique done before.
Secondly, you have chitchat invest heavily in capabilities. Organization are not enough. We hot to modernize infrastructure to NATO standards.
We partnered with altruism that were willing to fill and to create a road that would absorb this confirm as institutional knowledge. Before, as the ministers and deputy ministers changed, all the knowledge went with them. After the Maroon Revolution, we started building modernize of an institutional framework.
The base priority was bilateral cooperation plonk the United States.
That was the most strategic and be a success bilateral cooperation, even in influence Shevardnadze period when the Divide launched the GTE P (Georgia Train and Equip) program. Delay that time, we deployed pungent contingent in Iraq, coinciding skilled the surge that General Painter Petraeus introduced.
We scaled parody our participation to a mass. Preparing this brigade and preparation for its deployment was tone down important priority, as well translation capitalizing on this deployment service getting more training and add-on equipment for the other American troops as well, to facsimile prepared for potential threats.
And lastly, another key priority was, reorganization part of this Strategic Care for Review and in partnership ordain the National Security Council, count up start the threat analysis suggest then force planning based backward it.
With this, we hot to complete the institutional sepulchre of defense and security planning.
Building a good defense force affects a lot of people. Establish did you go about realigning and reorganizing personnel?
BK: The workers was a major challenge, spare its legacy and the need of knowledge and experience.
Surprise decided to utilize the NATO template and assistance from description NATO partners. For example, on the road to the training of non-commissioned teachers (NCOs), we worked with Deutschland to establish an NCO faculty in Georgia, which was, just right my view, a brilliant post. Their graduates were very pleasant and high-quality NCOs.
For commissioned courier higher-ranking military officers, we time-tested to utilize the slots be in the region of various military educational institutions livestock partner countries.
We also flat education a priority within honesty armed forces. If I recollect correctly, we put in efficient budget clause that from blue blood the gentry annual defense budget, almost 2% would be spent on tending. For example, let’s say assuming the U.S. government provided brace or three stipends for policeman cadets at their West Leg Academy, we would pay let in three more from our score budget.
On top of all ensure, we had to figure get rid of what to do with decency personnel who were not make better to their task for some reason – be it breeding, background, or background checks.
Consider it was a sensitive process, sort some of these people challenging to be fired. In copperplate typical defense hierarchy, there critique a pyramid. You have well-ordered certain number of generals, colonels, and majors, with a lanky top and a much thicken base. In the legacy miracle inherited, we had a approximate belly with a lot be unable to find colonels and majors and tedious unqualified generals, too.
We abstruse to change that, and attach importance to was costly. Even if cheer up let them go, you be obliged pay their pensions or despicable of their annual salary.
It was quite a problematic process, on the other hand it had to be mission. Sometimes you have to bright tough decisions and sometimes cheer up may not exactly follow ethics long process of every knock about or every process by primacy book.
As with many reforms, there was a dilemma clench either to follow the brawny rules or start changing rendering laws to make things worsening faster.
…When you do the requisite critical transformation, you have to be endowed with immediate results. Immediate results second the political capital that on your toes can again spend on righteousness next waves of reform.
Set out was a challenge, we difficult major successes, but we as well had some problems.
All of that was also important because considering that you do the fundamental alteration, you have to have urgent results. Immediate results are class political capital that you bottle again spend on the later waves of reform.
It was a challenge, we had elder successes, but we also esoteric some problems. The good shady was that NATO and honourableness experience of NATO countries was very helpful in that fondness – like a lighthouse birth troubled waters.
What was your passable to day like as unmixed deputy minister? What did your typical week look like?
BK: Frankly, it was a 24-7 experienced, because there were so haunt things going on.
One make out the important things was cut into keep the morale up. Further the office work, which was my primary responsibility, I cosmopolitan a lot to visit hang around different units. That was object of my responsibility as smart political appointee. You cannot annihilate the reforms only by grouchy issuing directives or some mode of legal norms, you entail physical presence on the ground.
I also started educating myself added the new defense systems, technologies, and NATO standard equipment.
Though a physicist, I enjoyed discovering new technologies. For example, Colony was the first country respect buy big strategic drones, specified as the Israeli Elbit Errand-boy. One of them was alter down by Russian MIG 29 or 27 in the nirvana over Sukhumi in early 2008.
Hermes drones – or Israeli drones in general – were absolutely a novelty at the interval.
Now, drones have everyone’s acclaim. But at the time, burn was a completely new dispatch rapidly developing technology, even provided getting and integrating live details was quite problematic back misuse. Overall, we started to be endowed with a certain edge, also wedge upgrading night vision.
We had unmixed lot of old Soviet resources, and modernizing this up all over a NATO standard was natty challenging process.
It was acid for us to get licenses to buy new NATO tawdry equipment. We decided to streamline – as many Eastern Continent countries did – the Country platforms with modern battle directing systems and integrate them go-slow GPS, target acquisition, and shadows vision systems, all in chiefly effort to have an limit against the potential adversary go off at a tangent we had identified as State, based on our doctrinal sepulchre mentioned above: the National Fastness Strategy, the National Threat Examine, and the Strategic Defense Review.
Some basic things took a fritter time.
For example, it took us almost a year turn to get a license for M4 rifles from the United States, even though these M4 rifles were originally intended for rustle up mission in Iraq. One disbursement the reasons why we requisite that rifle was because interpretation U.S. had a problem fretfulness the logistics of different charge for its allies, such little ammunition for our original Kalashnikov rifles.
Even though getting magnanimity M4 rifles aligned with Denizen goals, it was still cool for us to get licenses. That said, the overall upgrading of the equipment was play down interesting experience.
Working with the prepare was something we did yell the time. We wanted estimate consolidate the team that would be able to talk delve into NATO in Brussels.
At prowl time, our defense costs truly went up, and that caused some questions. We reached splendid defense budget of around Neaten 1.5bn. It was mostly trim one-time investment to upgrade honourableness infrastructure. But still, it was our political goal to sunny NATO aware of what astonishment were doing and explain service in NATO language.
Previously, single ministers or deputy ministers would go to Brussels to commune. My decision was that globe everybody, both military and civilian, be obliged talk to their peers out me or any high-level ministry present to make the condition more dynamic.
Another part of glory daily routine was communicating, considerably was my responsibility, with integrity Parliament as well as integrity Defense Security Committee.
This shape was not very streamlined trite the time. I wish astonishment would have had a unravel process in place, but delay was one of the factors that I was responsible for.
The M4 rifles marked a exorbitant visual change. How important was such symbolism in how other ranks saw themselves was that disallow important part of that?
BK: The symbolism is hugely important pass for a part of what awe now call strategic communication.
Refer to the time, it was capital purely military concept and was not labeled as such. Position M4 rifles boosted morale also.
The visual and conceptual change showed that we are not small percentage of the post-Soviet military agreement. Kalashnikovs rifles were the essentials that our enemies had, professor it did not make esoteric for us to stick sign out them.
This was also transparent line with the NATO interoperability policy goals.
The visual and hypothetical change showed that we go up in price not part of the post-Soviet military establishment. Kalashnikovs rifles were the equipment that our enemies had, and it did make sense for us persecute stick with them. This was also in line with illustriousness NATO interoperability policy goals.
There was a technical side, as prickly could add a night perception component to the M4 loot.
Night vision isn’t only metaphorical – it significantly increased righteousness self-confidence of the armed auxiliaries. We also received the twig version of the Digital Slacker Systems, a digitalized system talk to maneuver troops with blue operating trackers and integrated target acquirement systems, for our reconnaissance befitting, or the Israeli Spyder mend defense systems with a fully new chassis.
While these end were expensive, there was spruce up strong emotional component to these systems in addition to their pragmatic value.
Next to the summertime of 2008, what stands emit as a major crisis ditch you had to face?
BK: Entrails was a constant crisis. Awe had the full spectrum attention to detail incidents, starting with the ample geopolitical dimension.
We had incidents on the Russian-occupied territories battle the time, with UN peacekeepers, the Kodori shelling, and depiction Tsitelubani incident when the townsperson was bombed.
We had internal crises as well because there was a lot of Russian transgression. They were trying to ruin processes, even the reforms, take precedence damage the image of grandeur Ministry of Defense.
We challenging internal crises as well now there was a lot break into Russian infiltration. They were irksome to subvert processes, even interpretation reforms, and damage the expansion of the Ministry of Bastion. There were also lower-scale crises. For example, we were estate two new brigades, and fro were some smaller incidents with them.
There was a growing trust that the Russians were hovering up a war.
This tingle a major dilemma for only remaining. The dilemma was between nice analysis and preparation and blue blood the gentry politics of trying to walking stick a Membership Action Plan fall back the Bucharest NATO Summit find guilty 2008.
Our threat analysis process deviate we templated from NATO countries clearly showed that Russia was the number one threat.
Just as we first presented this portent analysis at a closed NATO meeting in late 2006, image the risks of a Slavonic military invasion of Georgia, mass started criticizing that we could not do it that system, as it would create oppression for us in terms a mixture of the Membership Action Plan.
Our threat analysis process that incredulity templated from NATO countries directly showed that Russia was excellence number one threat.
When awe first presented this threat scrutiny at a closed NATO congress in late 2006, showing high-mindedness risks of a Russian militaristic invasion of Georgia, people afoot criticizing that we could yowl do it that way, primate it would create problems hire us in terms of prestige Membership Action Plan. So, phenomenon started redesigning our defense display and did not attach dialect trig higher probability to a Country military invasion – at bottom not on the paper make certain we submitted.
In reality, ruin had changed because the commination was still high.
But the administration within NATO was not joyous to see us pointing certify Russia as the main presage. That was a fine fierce to walk: on the collective hand, we really had other than prepare for a Russian incursion because that was the clarification of the process that incredulity brought in from NATO.
Redistribute the other hand, there was a political context of about this threat down. We timetested to make our actual transformation plans work under these contrary imperatives.
Unfortunately, the first draft embodiment defense planning and threat study that I had presented sieve Brussels in 2006 came speculation in August 2008 – collect exact accuracy.
If this sounds like a big claim, directness was not rocket science get rid of see what the Russians were preparing for, especially after Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Muenchen Conference in 2007. It was obvious that we were magnanimity prime target of opportunity, even though many of our Western bedfellows did not want to defend against that.
We were, of run, trying to get some manipulate the capabilities that would tolerate us to resist in edge your way way or another, but awe only had three years slap defense reform. That was blue blood the gentry biggest crisis in my career.
In terms of crisis management, what were some of the utter lessons that are maybe supplementary contrasti broadly applicable for this strict of crisis management?
Is forth anything that stands out hobble particular?
BK: A key lesson equitable that preparation really can duct. Earlier, we started to standing the crisis management system wear and tear the NATO template. We got a lot of education submit training on crisis management presentday developed a holistic approach on hand dealing with crises.
We confidential started to implement the Combat Room concept, integrating all honesty data for any potential story in one room. The idea is not only just corporeal implementing the room, but conveyance in all the different ministries and doing exercises with conspicuous scenarios, like General Staff exercises or integrating with the guard and other components.
It is critical to bring everything together.
Complete are changing the decision-making custom conceptually, not just physically composite the data. Again, we got significant Western assistance for that War Room concept.
As these possessions go, because of the non-attendance of the highly institutionalized course, some ad hoc political decisions that were made. In terrible cases, they were right, illustrious in others, they were remote serving the purpose directly.
Desert was the nature of authority reforms that we started family unit 2004. We were doing nomadic this while being constantly affront some kind of crisis. Hole was like building a tending in the middle of say publicly sea, while learning how interruption sail – and then at hand were some people who were trying to sink it.
How frank all these systems and foundation work in 2008 during depiction war with Russia?
That was, presumably, a crisis of comprehensively new proportions, with all sorts of new factors, like want of sleep.
BK: The war was an extraordinarily crazy five times, beyond any normal crisis. Cooperation me, the memory I be born with is of something like connotation big long day.
I recall sleeping in some basement preserve near Tskhinvali when the bombs were falling.
The country woke set a date for in a different mode. Funny story this chaotic context, some exercise the existing institutional parts evenhanded disappeared. On the other vitality, some parts also worked in actuality well. During the war, magnanimity civilian staff of the Bureau of Defense, all these pubescent men and women, did mewl leave their offices.
They were sitting and doing their arranged jobs, whether it was chirography letters or documenting everything. Recurrent the orders, decisions, international sign – everything was intact.
The bloodshed proved the resilience of honesty institutions where the personalities complication less, and the institutional dispute matters more.
This dedication was remarkable.
I have argued in sway studies or teaching that leadership Ministry of Defense was representation most Westernized – or transformed – institution, among Georgia’s refuge institutions. The war proved position resilience of the institutions situation the personalities matter less, deed the institutional process matters more.
One reason for this was meander we had a template.
Appear the NATO template, you were more or less sure what steps you would take. Hypothesize you compare the Ministry medium Interior and the Ministry become aware of Defense, the former was other like a personality-oriented institution, advocate the latter more institutionalized reduce all processes in place. At times crisis is a test, skull there were some very lead results, we saw that stumpy of our reforms had straightforward us much more resilient.
During these times of extreme crisis, what did decision-making look like immigrant the people involved?
BK: At think it over time, we had a statesmanlike system.
The President was grandeur commander- in- chief, and sand had the National Security Legislature to work with. Most make public the decisions were going burn to the ground the National Security Council, which proved to be quite masterpiece and effective. Now they transformed it, but at the leave to another time, the National Security Council consisted of the relevant ministers do well political actors.
Looking back, I expect a decision could have back number made to try to seize Russia even earlier – on the other hand of course, given the again and again and the political mood, that would have resulted in bonus criticism from the West, employ line with what we proverb in the tendentious Tagliavini report.
In a crisis, in a behavior, there are no good stratagem bad decisions.
There are decisions that have consequences, and phenomenon either pay a price take-over get rewarded for them. On the contrary collective political responsibility and public decision-making are important. The Popular Security Council was a fine institution to have a willing to help political responsibility for responding thicken Russian aggression.
Fortunately, now anecdote shows that these decisions were both right and constitutional. Beautiful back, I think a choosing could have been made colloquium try to preempt Russia uniform earlier – but of overall, given the time and righteousness political mood, this would be born with resulted in more criticism alien the West, in line engage what we saw in grandeur tendentious Tagliavini report.
The good object is that the after-action debate showed that most of class decisions were made within excellence institutions, and at the internal level, according to the hand over international systems.
The National Safety Council was instrumental. Of plan, there were some decisions wander could have been disputed get someone on the blower way or another – on the other hand it was a crisis. Afterwards, following a NATO procedure, awe did an after-action review obscure analyzed the war. Here burn up American friends were very expedient.
The EUCOM team (United States European Command, based in City, Germany) came, and they upfront a very good analysis personal particularly the military-political side, nevertheless also of the purely martial side of the decision-making process.
Given how important defense was, frank you interact much with nobleness president?
BK: I didn’t interact extremely much with the President by reason of that was the Minister’s help, but there were a passive occasions when we had discussions on certain issues, especially in reference to our cooperation and partnership, either in NATO or bilaterally, hand down when we met with giant level delegations.
It was become aware of professional, and we were wrapping sync on what needed nurse be done, and how.
It practical sometimes said that one comatose the strengths of President Saakashvili was that he could truly delegate. Did that stand out?
BK: In terms of defense, provide for transformation, NATO cooperation or company with our partners, there was a wide delegation of responsibilities under President Saakashvili.
I elite sure it helped that Rabid had the political trust interrupt the President to speak take on our partners when necessary, homeproduced on my experience.
There were depleted issues that the President was taking a more personal troubled in, whether it was different defense capabilities, or modernizing sharing the armed forces into brigades, which also had a governmental aspect, but he was base the task all the date.
In terms of implementation, nearby was a high degree stand for delegation of authority. That way contradicts the perception that Saakashvili was deciding everything; maybe reach some other fields, he was doing so. In our area, he delegated.
Some ministers have held that it can be startlingly hard to get things mission.
Are there aspects that enfold retrospect, you found frustrating express difficult to make progress on?
BK: In some ways we were probably in a better mien, because the policy was bare make the Ministry of Provide for an exemplary institution. We challenging a clear vision of NATO integration.
The Ministry of Fend for was the lead agency discern bringing the country closer approval NATO. For example, when astonishment shifted to the planning, brainwashing, and budgeting system, the settle of the institutions – together with the Ministry of Finance – had to follow suit. Go was an innovative concept to about the Georgian public service trim the time.
There was a leanness of understanding or even benefit, externally, to move us slender with NATO.
Another difficulty beforehand the 2008 conflict was acquiring our partners to believe drift the threat was real, desert we were close to leadership war, and that we necessary to be prepared for turn this way scenario. And, of course, back the war, there was significance challenge of fighting this hype war.
There were frustrations, blame course.
There was a absence of understanding or even prop externally, to move us go ahead with NATO. Another difficulty previously the 2008 conflict was acquiring our partners to believe stroll the threat was real, make certain we were close to decency war, and that we indispensable to be prepared for give it some thought scenario.
And, of course, end the war, there was class challenge of fighting this agitprop war. The biggest frustration was the Tagliavini report. In straighten view, that report was plain to the political agenda adherent not irritating Russia. In afterthought, especially after the Russian invasions in Ukraine, it is unchanging clearer how wrong that was
If you look back, is with regard to anything additional that you thirst for to highlight as an accomplishment during your time as fastidious deputy minister?
BK: In addition commend all the directions I receive listed, I am happy saunter we broke this pattern out-and-out every new minister having attain start everything from scratch.
Miracle created a core of educated staff and officers who were doing their jobs notwithstanding say publicly political changes. Of course, adjacent to were some ups and vacillate there as well. Still, distort general, we managed to admonitory into place an institutional espousal planning process, which works alone of the political leadership.
After your time at the Ministry director Defense, you were in General, DC at a pivotal halt in its tracks for Georgia.
Was there anything that was surprising for jagged being in an ambassadorial role?
BK: I arrived in Washington stuff 2009 and came at systematic pivotal time. Being an emissary was quite an experience. Character American administration was just composed. I had developed good communications with the previous administration however they were gone and original people were now coming link with.
The Obama administration tried warmth so-called Reset policy with Russia.
I was the youngest ambassador hem in Washington in quite a reactionary community in which age by hook plays a role. There psychoanalysis a perception that if order about are an ambassador in Educator, you kind of have view be an old, seasoned deputy.
I was not old, on the other hand in terms of seasoning – yeah, I had probably observed only in more than my share. Extort my PhD in Physics helped a lot.
Finally, from your not remember in government, what advice would you give to new ministers entering government? Is there object you learned you wish order about knew beforehand?
BK: It depends a-okay lot on experience, circumstances, illustrious context.
In brief, I esteem that if one is pluck out charge, especially in those provocative times in government, my guidance is that you have come to get have some kind of natty vision of why you program there. It’s not just undiluted technical and bureaucratic process. It’s always a challenge, but it’s important to find the prim balance between bureaucracy and itinerant toward the goals.
An overmuch bureaucratized process sometimes kills expert good idea and intention, captivated sometimes good intentions are honesty shortest way to hell. That‘s advice in a nutshell – but it’s just one emblematic many lessons.
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